

How credible are Nigerian Election rigging claims?

Significant statistical anomalies in several southern states, but not enough to invalidate scale of Buhari win

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TORONTO – Nigeria’s main opposition party, the center-right Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and its leader Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar have rejected the country’s announced election results alleging massive nationwide rigging. How credible are these claims? DaMina’s thorough 36 (+1) state-by-state statistical analysis confirms that indeed the epicenter of significant voter anomalies in the South-South and South Eastern regions account for an unexplainable 1million+ votes lost to the opposition. However even if the votes from the errant states are re-tallied, incumbent President Buhari would still have an unassailable lead due to his larger northwestern and southwestern demographic bases of support. Only a total invalidation of the entire election result nationwide, such as happened in Kenya by the Supreme Court will give the opposition a shot at power.

▪ Variance between 2019 Registered Voter Roll, Voter ID Collection Rates & Official Population Census

Nigeria’s last official population census was in 2006. In 2016 the country’s National Population Council was not able to hold an official census, however it reported an official population estimate, which forms the basis of current national fiscal policy. Comparing the official voter register to the 2016 population several anomalies emerge:

1. Between the official 2006 census and official 2016 populational estimate, on average all the states that President Mohammad Buhari is declared to have won in 2019 saw a population growth of 37%, compared to an average population growth of 35% for Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar (excluding the capital Abuja). Using the 2006 population census as a baseline, the 'Buhari leaning states' totaled 80million persons, while the 'Abubakar leaning states' totaled just 70million persons. Thus, heading into the 2019 voter registration exercise the 'Buhari base' had a strong statistically significant voter advantage of at least 4million votes implying that only a 'strong turnout wave election' could have given the Abubakar camp the necessary votes to dent Buhari’s larger demographic electoral base. Abubakar looks like he was not able to achieve this feat.
2. With the average Abubakar voter boasting a higher income than the average Buhari voter, the postponement may have reduced Abubakar’s turnout more significantly than Buhari’s as the higher income earners ironically were not as motivated to turnout on election day as the lower income earners. There is a nearly 50% difference in the average income of a Buhari voter vis-à-vis an Abubakar voter according to average state payroll statistics for 2018.
3. During the voter registration exercise while the national average of voters registered as a percentage of census population was 44%, on average the 'Buhari leaning states' registered was only 42% compared to 46% for 'Abubakar leaning states.' This statistic implies that the anti-

Buhari leaning states were more motivated to register and vote, than the pro-Buhari leaning states.

4. However, a week to the officially scheduled presidential poll on February 11, 2019, Nigeria's electoral commission released a tally of registered voters who had 'collected' their voter ID cards. This was another measure of voter enthusiasm. While Abubakar leaning states during the registration were more enthusiastic than Buhari leaning states, the ID card collection rates gave a further strong indication of which party was most prepared for the poll and had its voters ready to vote on election day. While there were some state-by-state variances, overall the difference in average voter ID collection rates in Buhari leaning states compared to Abubakar leading states was a statistically insignificant 1%.

▪ Turnout anomalies

Contrary to perceptions that the 2019 election had much lower turnout than previous elections, average aggregate national turnout between the 2015 and 2019 are remarkably similar. While there were marked differences in the distribution of turnout across states, the aggregate national turnout trends were relatively equal. Thus, while the delay may have hurt voters in certain states more than others, on balance the average aggregate national rate does not show any statistically significant change between the 2015 and the 2019. State-by-state results however captures a different worrying trend – which strongly supports the rigging claims of the opposition.

1. While on average national turnout as a percentage of Voter ID collected (not registered voters) was 38%, there was a statistically significant and unexplainable **17%** spread anomaly between those states won by Buhari and those won by Abubakar.

On average the states Buhari won had a 10% higher turnout than the states Abubakar won. This statistical anomaly is not supported by the relatively even pre-election registration and Voter ID card collection rates.

- a. Previously above, we had established that President Buhari entered the election with a 4million demographic advantage, however during BOTH the voter registration exercises which occurred for most of 2018 and the collection of voter IDs – No statistically significant pattern emerged during the voter ID collection, even though during the registration, the anti-Buhari leaning states appeared more enthusiastic and registered in high numbers.
2. On average while the variance in 2019 vis-à-vis 2015 turnout in Abubakar leaning states was just 8%, in Buhari leaning states this variance jumps to a whopping 25%.
 - a. In one state alone **Borno**, which Buhari won, and which is one of the epicenters of Boko Haram attacks turnout unexplainably jumps by over 111% over 2015.
 - b. Meanwhile in **Anambra**, which is the home state of the opposition vice president and previous governor, turnout fell by 2% over 2015. (Conversely Vice President Yemi Osinbajo recorded a 38% improved turnout in his home state, Ogun).
 - c. In opposition strongholds **Delta, Rivers** and **Akwa Ibom** states, turnout over 2015 unexplainably fell by an average of 40%.

Nigerian Election 2019 - Statistical Anomalies Signal Significant Vote Manipulation in South-South, South East

Nigerian State	Pop Census (2006)	Pop Census 2016 Official Estimate	Census Pop Growth '06 - '16	Registered Voters 2019 - INEC	2019 Registered Votes as % of Pop	Collected Voter ID Cards @ Feb 11, 2019	Collected Voter ID as % of Registered Voters	Election Day Turnout as % of Collected Voter IDs	2015 State Turnout	Var btwn 2015 - 2019 Turnout	RAW 2019 State Votes - INEC	Buhari 2019 Votes	Abubakar 2019 Votes	Avg Monthly Payroll Tax per adult - Q1-Q3 2018
ABIA	2,845,380	3,727,347	31%	1,932,892	52%	1,729,943	90%	18%	20%	-10%	306,584	85,058	219,698	\$ 0.77
ADAMAWA	3,178,950	4,248,436	34%	1,973,083	46%	1,788,706	91%	44%	32%	40%	793,864	378,078	410,266	\$ 0.51
AKWA/IBOM	3,902,051	5,482,177	40%	2,119,727	39%	1,933,362	91%	30%	48%	-38%	572,018	175,429	395,832	\$ 2.02
ANAMBRA	4,177,828	5,527,809	32%	2,447,727	44%	2,071,714	85%	27%	28%	-2%	563,455	33,298	524,738	\$ 0.81
BAUCHI	4,653,066	6,537,314	40%	2,462,843	38%	2,335,717	95%	43%	41%	5%	1,008,894	798,428	209,313	\$ 0.68
BAYELSA	1,704,515	2,277,961	34%	923,182	41%	769,509	83%	41%	40%	4%	318,169	118,821	197,933	\$ 2.94
BENUE	4,253,641	5,741,815	35%	2,480,131	43%	2,244,376	90%	32%	27%	16%	711,033	347,668	356,817	\$ 0.77
BORNO	4,171,104	5,860,183	40%	2,315,956	40%	2,000,228	86%	45%	22%	111%	909,283	836,496	71,788	\$ 0.33
CROSS RIVER	2,892,988	3,866,269	34%	1,527,289	40%	1,387,314	91%	30%	29%	3%	415,307	117,302	295,737	\$ 1.19
DELTA	4,112,445	5,663,362	38%	2,845,274	50%	2,470,924	87%	33%	44%	-25%	820,623	221,292	594,068	\$ 4.29
EBONYI	2,176,947	2,880,383	32%	1,459,933	51%	1,299,048	89%	27%	24%	15%	351,044	90,726	258,573	\$ 0.58
EDO	3,233,366	4,235,595	31%	2,210,534	52%	1,726,738	78%	32%	22%	42%	548,477	267,842	275,691	\$ 1.61
EKITI	2,398,957	3,270,798	36%	909,967	28%	666,591	73%	56%	33%	72%	374,273	219,231	154,032	\$ 0.71
ENUGU	3,267,837	4,411,119	35%	1,944,016	44%	1,787,537	92%	23%	29%	-21%	412,193	54,423	355,553	\$ 1.23
GOMBE	2,365,040	3,256,962	38%	1,394,393	43%	1,335,223	96%	41%	33%	24%	542,223	402,961	138,484	\$ 0.53
IMO	3,927,563	5,408,756	38%	2,272,293	42%	1,702,178	75%	28%	30%	-8%	477,961	140,463	334,923	\$ 0.72
JIGAWA	4,361,002	5,828,163	34%	2,111,106	36%	1,625,721	77%	67%	49%	38%	1,090,264	794,738	289,895	\$ 0.36
KADUNA	6,113,503	8,252,366	35%	3,932,492	48%	3,648,831	93%	45%	41%	10%	1,646,052	993,445	649,612	\$ 0.90
KANO	9,401,288	13,076,892	39%	5,457,747	42%	4,696,747	86%	40%	39%	2%	1,858,317	1,464,768	391,593	\$ 0.62
KATSINA	5,801,584	7,831,319	35%	3,230,230	41%	3,187,988	99%	48%	45%	8%	1,540,905	1,232,133	308,056	\$ 0.38
KEBBI	3,256,541	4,440,050	36%	1,806,231	41%	1,718,180	95%	43%	37%	16%	738,923	581,552	154,282	\$ 0.31
KOGI	3,314,043	4,473,490	35%	1,646,350	37%	1,435,751	87%	36%	25%	41%	511,122	285,894	218,207	\$ 0.80
KWARA	2,365,353	3,192,893	35%	1,406,457	44%	1,149,969	82%	39%	31%	26%	448,799	308,984	138,184	\$ 1.06
LAGOS	9,113,605	12,550,598	38%	6,570,291	52%	5,531,389	84%	19%	22%	-12%	1,054,114	580,825	448,015	\$ 10.85
NASARAWA	1,869,377	2,523,395	35%	1,617,786	64%	1,442,184	89%	40%	32%	26%	574,612	289,903	283,847	\$ 1.54
NIGER	3,954,772	5,556,247	40%	2,390,035	43%	2,173,204	91%	38%	34%	13%	831,832	612,371	218,052	\$ 0.68
OGUN	3,751,140	5,217,716	39%	2,375,003	46%	1,694,867	71%	30%	22%	38%	508,332	281,762	194,655	\$ 4.44
ONDO	3,460,877	4,671,695	35%	1,822,346	39%	1,478,460	81%	36%	30%	19%	531,533	241,769	275,901	\$ 0.95
OSUN	3,416,959	4,705,589	38%	1,680,498	36%	1,266,587	75%	54%	38%	44%	688,274	347,634	337,377	\$ 0.72
OYO	5,580,894	7,840,864	40%	2,934,107	37%	2,176,352	74%	36%	28%	27%	781,033	365,229	366,690	\$ 0.83
PLATEAU	3,206,531	4,200,442	31%	2,480,455	59%	2,095,409	84%	49%	39%	23%	1,019,915	468,555	548,665	\$ 0.80
RIVERS	5,198,716	7,303,924	40%	3,215,273	44%	2,833,101	88%	22%	48%	-54%	627,674	150,710	473,971	\$ 6.73
SOKOTO	3,702,676	4,998,090	35%	1,903,166	38%	1,726,887	91%	49%	43%	14%	853,018	490,333	361,604	\$ 1.06
TARABA	2,294,800	3,066,834	34%	1,777,105	58%	1,729,094	97%	41%	32%	26%	700,953	324,906	374,743	\$ 0.42
YOBE	2,321,339	3,294,137	42%	1,365,913	41%	1,261,914	92%	44%	35%	26%	549,229	497,914	50,763	\$ 0.37
ZAMFARA	3,278,873	4,515,427	38%	1,717,128	38%	1,626,839	95%	35%	44%	-21%	564,626	438,682	125,423	\$ 0.40
FCT ABUJA	1,406,239	3,564,126	153%	1,344,856	38%	1,026,920	76%	40%	23%	79%	415,195	152,224	259,997	\$ 9.97
	140,431,790	193,500,540		84,003,815		72,775,502	87%	38%	33%	17%	26,660,123	15,191,847	11,262,978	\$ 1.726

Source: NPC/INEC/DaMina Advisors

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